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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1)

Does Appellants1 failure to cite to the record and

failure to support their claim of error with an adequate record
of the facts constitute grounds for summary affirmance?
2)

Did the district court judge properly find that an

extraordinary writ is an inappropriate remedy?
3)

Was there an appropriate remedy of appeal available

to Appellants which precluded the district court from granting an
extraordinary writ?
4)

Does the district court have supervisory power over

the circuit court?
5)

Did the district court judge properly refuse to

reach the merits of the case?
6)

Did the district court1s ruling that appellant

failed to join an indispensable party prejudice Appellant?
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Respondents.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants petitioned the Second District Court for a
writ of prohibition claiming the Second Circuit Court acted
without authority in forfeiting certain bonds and revoking the
bonding privileges of Appellants in that court.

The district

court refused to exercise supervisory power over the circuit
court and found that an extraordinary writ was an inappropriate
remedy.

Consequently, the district court denied Appellants

petition without reaching the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants are bail bondsmen who, prior to the
initiation of this action in the Second District Court, were
qualified to post bonds in the Second Circuit Court (T. 14, R.
47).

Respondents Ted S. Perry and David W. Sorenson preside as

circuit judges in the Second Circuit Court (T. 30, 38). Bondsman
Edwin 0. Tolman issued bonds in the Second Circuit Court in
behalf of four criminal defendants; Kathy Garcia, Lyle B. Haws,
Lester J. Robertson, and David R. Minor (T. 14, 16, 21, 23).
Defendants Garcia and Haws failed to make themselves subject to
the Second Circuit Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of
executing sentences imposed by that court (T. 48-49).
Defendant's Robertson and Minor failed to appear for arraignment
and trial, respectively (T. 49). Judge Perry ordered each bond
forfeited (T. 32). Appellants did not appeal Judge Perry's
forfeiture rulings to the district court (T. 32).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court properly found that an extraordinary
writ is an inappropriate remedy in the instant case. An
appropriate remedy would have been a direct appeal to the
district court from the forfeiture judgments of the circuit
court.

Failure to raise that appeal constitutes a waiver.

Furthermore, pursuant to the constitution of Utah, Article VIII
§ 5, the district court no longer has supervisory authority over
circuit courts.

Consequently, the district court properly

refused to reach the merits of the case as to whether Appellants
are liable for the forfeited bonds or should be reinstated as
qualified to write bonds in the second circuit court.
A collateral issue is presented by whether Appellants
failed to join an indispensable party.

The district court's

ruling is unsupported by case law, but Appellants were not
prejudiced and therefore, reversal is not warranted.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS FAILED TO CITE TO THE RECORD IN
THEIR BRIEF AS REQUIRED BY RULE 24(a) (6) f
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, WHICH
CONSTITUTES GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE.
Rule 24(a)(6), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985)
provides in pertinent part:
There shall follow a statement of facts
relevant to the issues presented for review.
All statement of facts and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record.
Appellants failed to support their claim of error with an
adequate record of the facts and failed to cite to the record.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's
findings.

State v. Gardea. 22 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Nov. 18, 1985);

State v. Sutton. 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Oct. 2, 1985).
POINT II
APPELLANTS* REQUEST FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY UNDER UTAH LAW.
Pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 5
(effective July 1, 1985), district courts have the power to issue
all extraordinary writs.

However, that power is limited to

situations in which no other remedy is available and substantial
injustice would otherwise occur.

It is a well established

principle that an extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for
general review.

Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283

(1956); 01 sen v. District Court. Second Judicial District. 106
Utah 220, 147 P.2d 471 (1944); Robinson v. City Court of Opden.
112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1947); Chesney v. District Court of
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Salt Lake County, 108 P.2d 514 (Utah 1941).

Rule 65B(a), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent partf "where no
other plain, speedy, adequate remedy exists, relief may be
obtained by appropriate action under these rules . • • ."
[Emphasis added]•
Applying Rule 65B, this Court has held that if the
lower court is proceeding without jurisdiction, but it appears
that there is an adequate remedy, a writ should generally not
issue.

Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939).

Also

if there is no want or excess of jurisdiction and an adequate
remedy exists, a writ should never issue.
£aiir±, supra.

Qlsen v. District

Furthermore, this Court held that if there was an

adequate remedy of appeal from a lower court that has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and the
party permits it to lapse, he does so at his peril and an
extraordinary writ should not lie.

Anderson v. Baker. 5 Utah 2d

33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956).
Applying these findings to the instant case, because it
is not contested that the Second Circuit Court has jurisdiction
over Appellants, the critical issue becomes whether direct appeal
was available to Appellants as an appropriate remedy.
POINT III
APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT COURT PROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT'S FORFEITURE RULING WAS AN APPROPRIATE
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO APPELLANTS WHICH
PRECLUDED THE DISTRICT COURT FROM GRANTING AN
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT.
Appellants contend that the district judge erred in not
granting a writ of prohibition.

Appellants also recognize that

-4-

if the district judge concluded that an appeal was an appropriate
remedy, his denial of the extraordinary writ would be warranted.
Appellants cite People V. Tremayner a 1884 Utah casef for the
proposition that appeal is not available from a bail forfeiture
order.

3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85 (1884).

Although Tremayne has not

been overruled, Appellants candidly admit that the holding is
incorrect in light of recent statutory revisions and many wellreasoned cases from other jurisdictions which allow appeals from
bail forfeiture rulings.

(See Appellant's brief at 5).

Moreover, this Court entertained an appeal from a
circuit court bail forfeiture order which had been appealed to
the district court. Walton v» Circuit Court/ No. 16281 (Utah
1979) (See Appendix A ) .

Appealability of a bond forfeiture order

was not an issue, but the case was successfully appealed to the
district court and the district court order was appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court.
decision.

This Court did not mention Tremayne in its

Consequently, bond forfeiture orders appear to be

appealable in Utah, notwithstanding Tremayne.
Appeal procedures from the circuit court to the
district court are provided for by law.

Constitution of Utah,

Article VIII § 5 (1985); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-4, 78-3-5, and
78-4-11 (1953, as amended).

An appeal lies from judgments

obtained pursuant to the Bail Forfeiture Procedure Act, § 77-20a1 et. seq. (1983).

There have been no decisions by this Court

construing the provisions of that Act.

However, cases in other

jurisdictions with substantially similar provisions have held
that orders dealing with the forfeiture of bail are appealable.
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People v. Wilcox. 53 Cal.2d 651, 2 Cal. Rptr. 754r 349 P.2d 522
(1960); Smaldon v. United States, 211 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Cardina Casualty Ins. Co,. 237 F.2d 451 (7th
Cir. 1956); State v. Cotton, 172 La. 295, 110 So. 480 (1926);
State v. Wright. 51 Wash.2d 606, 320 P.2d 646 (1958).
Therefore, Appellants should have availed themselves of
the proper judicial remedies and procedures pursuant to the Bail
Forfeiture Procedures Act and filed a timely appeal.
to do so constituted a waiver.

A failure

Consequently, the Second District

Court properly held that relief in the form of an extraordinary
writ was not warranted.
POINT IV
PURSUANT TO A CONSTITUTIONAL REPEAL AND
REENACTMENT, DISTRICT COURTS NO LONGER HAVE
GENERAL SUPERVISORY POWER OVER CIRCUIT COURTS
IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
Appellants rely on Hillyard v. Logan City Court, 57 8
P.2d 1270 (Utah 1978) and Wells v. City Court of Logan, 535 P.2d
683 (Utah 1975) for the proposition that the district court has
supervisory authority over circuit courts. Both cases were
decided when the Constitution of Utah specifically enumerated
such a power.

However, a recent amendment to the Constitution of

Utah has removed the supervisory power district courts previously
had over circuit courts. Article VIII § 5 of the constitution of
Utahf effective July 1, 1985, states as follows:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power
to issue all extraordinary writs. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally
-6-

with the supreme court, there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
The prior Constitutional provision, Article VIIIf § 7,
granting jurisdiction to the district court provided:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in this Constitution,
and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and

tribunals, and a supervisory control of the
same. The district courts or any judge
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give
them a general control over inferior courts
and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions. [Emphasis added.]
The former provision of the constitution granted the
district court supervisory control over inferior courts.

The new

constitutional provision conspicuously omitted the language
dealing with the district courts supervisory powers over inferior
courts, i.e. circuit courts.

When the new constitutional

provision took effect, this provision specifically removed any
prior supervisory authority the district court had over the
circuit court under the repealed provisions.
Section 78-3-4 of the District Court Act, enacted in
1953 and amended in 1983, provides:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the
sam£. The district courts, or any judges
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
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warranto^ certiorari, prohibition, and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give

them a general control over inferior courts
and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions . . . . [Emphasis added.]
This provision was enacted pursuant to the authority specified in
Article VIII, § 7 of the prior Constitutional article and grants
to the district court supervisory authority over inferior courts,
in conformity with the prior constitutional provision. With the
adoption of the new Judicial article, that portion of § 7 8-3-4
granting the district court supervisory authority over inferior
courts is inconsistent with the new Article VIII, § 5.
As a general principle, a statute existing at the
adoption of a Constitution or constitutional amendment cannot be
upheld if it is opposed to the plain terms of the Constitution.
In such a case, the statute may be regarded as repealed by the
constitutional provision by implication.

United States v. Mack,

295 U.S. 480 (1935); Massey v. United States. 291 U.S. 608
(1934); United States v. Chambers. 291 U.S. 217 (1934); National
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Veterans' Welfare Bdt V.
&ilgy, 189 Cal. 159, 208 P. 678 (1922); Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio
226, 98 NE2d 401 (1951) .
The final test in determining whether a statute is
repealed by implication by a constitutional provision is: Does
the legislature have the present right to enact statutes
substantially like the statute in question under the new
constitutional provision.

Monaghan v« Lewis, 5 Penn. 218, 59 A.

948 (Deleware 1905).
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In applying this test to the instant case, the
Legislature has the right to enact a statute substantially like
§ 78-3-4, except for the supervisory language.

The Legislature

does not have the right to enact a statute which would grant to
the district courts supervisory powers over inferior courts.
Further, if the authority of the Legislature to enact a
particular statute is derived solely from a particular
constitutional provision, a repeal of such provision operates as
a repeal of the statute.

United States v. Cnnstantine. 296 U.S.

287, 80 L.Ed. 233, 56 S.Ct. 223 (1935).
Chambers, supra.

United States v.

Therefore, a repeal of the constitutional

provisions dealing with the district courts supervisory authority
over inferior courts operates as a repeal of those provisions of
§ 78-3-4 granting supervisory powers of the district court over
inferior courts.
Section 4 of the Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, Laws
1984 (2d S.S.), providing for the repeal and reenactment of
Article VIII, states in part:
Existing statutes and rules on the effective
date [July 1, 1985] of this amendment
[Article VIII], not inconsistent with it,
shall continue in force and effect until
repealed or changed by statute.
This savings clause inserted by the Legislature provides that all
statutes in force and not inconsistent with the new
constitutional provision shall continue until amended or repealed
by the Legislature.

However, by this enactment, the Legislature

recognized that inconsistent statutes cannot continue in force
and are therefore repealed by implication.

-9-

Therefore, those

provisions of § 7 8-3-4 granting such supervisory powers to the
district court cannot be saved and are of no effect*
The powers given the district court by constitutional
provision cannot be enlarged or abridged by the Legislature.
Robinson V. Durandr 36 Utah 93, 104 P. 760 (1908).

The district

court is limited to those powers granted it by the Constitution.

StLtCt Vt Christensen Co,, 34 Utah 38, 95 p. 523 (1939);
Wadsworth v, Santaquin City. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933);

National Tunnel & Mines Co. v» Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39,
102 P.2d 508 (1940).

Therefore, the district court properly

refused to exercise supervisory authority over the circuit court
pursuant to constitutional mandate.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO
REACH THE MERITS WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER
APPELLANTS ARE LIABLE FOR THE FORFEITED BONDS
OR SHOULD BE REINSTATED AS QUALIFIED TO WRITE
BONDS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT.
As argued above, the district court properly denied
Appellants1 petition for an extraordinary writ and refused to
exercise supervisory authority over the circuit court.

These

rulings prevented the district court from reaching the merits of
the case because to do so would have been in excess of its
jurisdiction and authority.

Moreover, because the district court

is without supervisory authority over the circuit court, the
district court judge properly refused to review the
qualifications of bondsmen to issue bonds in the circuit court.
Furthermore, because Appellants failed to appeal the
circuit court's forfeiture rulings with regard to the terms of
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the bonds to the district court, they waived that right.
Anderson v. Bakerf supra.

Consequently, Appellants are compelled

to comply with the circuit court findings due to their own
inaction.

Finally, Appellants claim that once granted, the right

to issue bonds becomes a property interest and may not be revoked
without due process.

However, Appellants fail to state facts or

refer to the record to support its claim of error.

Therefore,

this Court should affirm on this point without considertion.
State v, Gardea, 22 ot. Adv. Rep. 11 (Nov. 18, 1985).
POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURTS RULING THAT THE CASE WAS
NOT JUSTICIABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF CERTAIN
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS A COLLATERAL ISSUE
WHICH HAS NO SIGNIFICANT BEARING ON THE
COURT'S FINDINGS.
The d i s t r i c t court judge determined t h a t c e r t a i n
indispensable p a r t i e s were absent and the case was therefore not
justiciable.

I t appears from the f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h a t Judge

Wahlquist considered the criminal defendants who f a i l e d t o appear
in the c a s e s before the Second C i r c u i t Court i n d i s p e n s a b l e
p a r t i e s t o the a c t i o n brought by A p p e l l a n t s .

The S t a t e i s unable

t o find any a u t h o r i t y t o support t h a t p o s i t i o n .
However, Appellants were not prejudiced by the d i s t r i c t
court's ruling.

I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d in Utah t h a t t h i s Court

w i l l only reverse a lower court d e c i s i o n i f there i s a reasonable
l i k e l i h o o d t h a t , absent the e r r o r , the r e s u l t would have been
more favorable t o the complaining party.
702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985) .
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In Rg E s t a t e of Kesler r

In the instant casef the district court's ruling with
regard to the absence of indispensable parties had absolutely no
impact on the rights or liabilities of the parties.

Particularly

in light of the district court's findings that an extraordinary
writ was inappropriate and its refusal to exercise supervisory
authority over the circuit court.

Therefore, such an

inconsequential error does not warrant reversal of an otherwise
sound decision.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the
findings of the district court in denying Appellants' petition
for an extraordinary writ, in refusing to exercise supervisory
authority over the circuit court, and in refusing to reach the
merits.
DATED this

//

day of April, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DIANE W. WILKINS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to A.W. Lauritzen,
Attorney for Appellant, 3 26 North 100 East, P.O. Box 171, Logan,
Utah 84321, this

//

day of April, 1985.
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ADDENDUM

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Vincent P. Walton, et al.f
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Circuit Court, State of Utah,
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City
Department, and the Honorable
Maurice D. Jones, Circuit Judge,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. 16281
FILED
December 12, 1979

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

PER CURIAM:
Defendants appeal from an adverse summary judgment
ordering the exoneration of the undertakings of the bail bonds
of four defendants in cases filed in the Salt Lake City Court,
now the Circuit Court. Each of the four defendants had been
charged in the Salt Lake City Court with a misdemeanor and had
been admitted to bail on undertakings complying with the requirements of Section 77-43-13, U.C.A. 1953, furnished by the
plaintiff. In the course of the proceedings, each defendant
had been convicted or had entered a guilty plea, and had
personally appeared in court and been sentenced to pay a fine
of $150.00. Some records pertaining to the cases have been
lost. However, the documents available indicate that the
sentence was to pay a fine and they do not show that any jail
sentence had been imposed as a part of any sentence, nor to
enforce payment of any fine. The court gave each defendant
30 days to pay the fine, which period expired without payment.
Proceedings were instituted against the bondsman on the theory
that the undertaking in the bail bonds required the bondsman
to pay any fine imposed if the defendants failed to pay as
ordered. All four bonds were ordered to be forfeited. The
bondsman sought relief in the District Court, and obtained a
judgment ordering, among other things, that the Circuit Court
exonerate the undertakings in bail and release the bondsman
from liability.
The liability of the bondsman is determined by the
terms of the suretyship undertaking. There is no express
requirement in the language of the undertaking that imposes
liability on the bondsman for payment of any fine. There is
a statement "that the defendant will render himself in execution of the judgment." This statement presupposes that the
judgment is one that provides for imprisonment or for imprisonment to enforce payment of a fine. A judgment limited to a
fine constitutes a lien, upon which an execution may be issued
as on a judgment in a civil action.

In the words of Justice Cordoza: "In the discretion
of the court the judgment may direct that the defendant shall
be imprisoned until the fine is paid. If the direction for
imprisonment is omitted, the remedy by execution is exclusive.
Imprisonment does not follow automatically upon a showing of
default in payment. It follows, if at all, because the consequence has been prescribed in the imposition of the sentence.
The choice of pains and penalties, when choice is committed
to the discretion of the court, is part of the judicial function. This being so, it must have expression in the sentence,
and the sentence is the judgment.ff Hill v. United States,
298 U.S. 460, 80 L. Ed. 1283, 56 S. Ct. 760.
When fines only were imposed against the four defendants, they could no longer be subjected to any detention
on the charges and judgments against then. The purpose for the
bail bonds had been fulfilled, and their bondsman was released
from any further liability.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
costs awarded.
Wilkins, Justice, does not participate herein.
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